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Abstract. I consider how photographic image manipulation and deception influence 
both interpretation and evaluation of photographs. First I distinguish between image 
manipulation and deception by clarifying that image manipulation does not necessarily 
lead to deception in terms of forming false beliefs. I also argue that image manipula-
tion is not the only way of using photographs deceptively, and I provide examples for 
photographic deception that do not rely on image manipulation. Then I examine what 
role the readability of photographic properties (including if and how they have been 
manipulated) plays in their interpretation. I introduce the concept of photographic 
illocutionary acts to account for the interpretation of photographic images, and I argue 
that the default interpretation of photographs is always based on our knowledge of the 
specific ontological and epistemic status of photographs in general, and which distin-
guishes them from non-photographic images. I conclude that our knowledge about 
the ease and frequency of analogue or digital image manipulation does not alter our 
default interpretation with which we approach photographs.
Keywords. Photography, manipulation, deception, photographic illocutionary acts, 
readability.
1. INTRODUCTION
Using photographs in ways that deceive the viewer is as old 
as the medium itself. It is merely the technology available for the 
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Mobility, Cooperation and Internationalisation». My work was also supported in 
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and by the Budapest University of Technology and Economics. I am most grate-
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cia). The support of my colleagues in Murcia during my Fundación Séneca fel-
lowship and beyond was invaluable for the development of this paper.
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various kinds of deceptive techniques that has 
changed and, of course, the various contexts in 
which photographic deception may occur. There 
are considerably more contexts today in which 
people produce and use photographs than a hun-
dred and fifty, a hundred or even fifty years ago, 
and hence there are also considerably more ways 
for using photographic images to deceive view-
ers.
Since digital photography has become avail-
able, laypersons and trained photographers alike 
have often commented on how easy it now is to 
manipulate photographs. Such remarks also often 
imply that due to the possibility of digital image 
manipulation we can trust photographic imag-
es less today than we could trust them earlier in 
the history of the medium. In this paper I do not 
claim that the ease or frequency of digital manipu-
lation is especially important for how we approach 
photographs. On the contrary; I suggest that only 
reasonable doubt about the reliability of photo-
graphic content will change our default interpre-
tation. The mere awareness of the possibility of 
image manipulation and deception is not sufficient 
for changing our default approach.
In what follows I first discuss the difference 
between the manipulation of photographic imag-
es and photographic deception, arguing that only 
some instances of the former constitute a subcat-
egory of the latter. This discussion is embedded in 
the context of explicating photographic deception 
in terms of coming to have false beliefs about the 
depicted content of the image. Then, in section 3, 
I consider the role of readability of photographic 
properties in the process of the various forms of 
photographic deception. In section 4 I introduce 
the notion of photographic illocutionary acts for 
explaining the interpretation of photographic 
images and also for providing an account of the 
mechanisms of photographic deception. Finally, 
in section 5 I argue that our default photographic 
interpretation is not influenced by our knowledge 
about the ease or frequency of analogue or digital 
manipulation of photographic images.
2. THE VERACITY OF THE MEDIUM: 
PHOTOGRAPHIC IMAGE MANIPULATION 
VERSUS PHOTOGRAPHIC DECEPTION
In order to understand the difference between 
photographic image manipulation and photo-
graphic deception we first need to explicate what 
is meant by photographic deception. Walden 
(2008) summarizes the basic questions concerning 
the veracity of the medium of photography as fol-
lows. It is apparent that while some photographs 
enable us to form true beliefs about the scene they 
depict, others might be deceptive in the sense 
that by looking at them we will come to have 
false beliefs about the depicted scene. The beliefs 
we form are perceptual (as opposed to language 
based symbolic beliefs)2. Walden refers to Fodor’s 
(1983, 1990) two-staged theory of perception to 
explain the connection between looking at objects 
and scenes and looking at their images. In the first 
stage input to the modular visual system is pro-
cessed without having access to information about 
the photographic or non-photographic nature of 
the image. Visual properties are processed, objects 
are recognised, etc. by the same visual system in 
the case of looking at them directly or looking 
at photographic or non-photographic images of 
them3. At this stage, however, we merely process 
the visual input without forming fully-fledged 
beliefs about the status (real scene, photographic 
or non-photographic image) of what we see.
Walden refers to the outputs of this first stage 
of the visual system as «proto-beliefs». I prefer to 
talk about these states as mental representations 
in connection to which we do not yet hold any 
psychological attitude such as belief or desire (see 
Bátori [2011]); but for our present purposes here 
the difference is terminological. For the formation 
of our fully-fledged perceptual beliefs, however, 
our other beliefs about the nature of our visual 
experience become crucial. During this second 
2 See Bátori (2011), for instance, for an explanation of the 
difference between perceptual and symbolic mental rep-
resentations (beliefs and imaginings) in the context of 
looking at photographic images.
3 See also Currie (1995).
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stage we consider if we are seeing things directly 
or if we are looking at their pictorial representa-
tions. In the latter case the differences between 
photographic and non-photographic images will 
also be considered for further inferences (among 
others, about the reliability of the image). We 
are deceived only if we form false (fully-fledged) 
beliefs about the depicted scene on the basis of its 
image type (photograph, painting, etc.).
Walden argues that we generally believe that 
photographic images are more reliable sourc-
es of information about the visual properties of 
depicted scenes than non-photographic images 
because we know about the objective nature of 
the mechanical processes in photography. On the 
other hand, we also know about the subjectivity 
of the mental states that may affect the truthful-
ness of the image when artists produce non-pho-
tographic (hand-made) images. Finally, Walden 
also notes that, at least in the case of some photo-
graphic genres, there is a strong institutional and/
or social pressure to safeguard the reliability of 
images. Photojournalists working for established 
news media, for instance, must observe and follow 
strict professional ethical standards, therefore even 
in the light of the ease of digital manipulation 
their photographs are still considered trustworthy.
Let us turn now to the connection between 
manipulation and deception, in order to see how 
we might come to have false beliefs when looking 
at photographs. Although various techniques for 
photographic image manipulation have been avail-
able from the early days of the medium, it is the 
digital age that has made people especially aware 
of, and worried about, the likelihood of encoun-
tering deceptive photographic images. It is not 
that before this era people did not know about the 
existence of such techniques; they did know about 
them. Nevertheless, they also knew that those 
techniques required highly specialised skills and 
laboratory equipment, and this prevented image 
manipulation from becoming an everyday occur-
rence. Today, however, nearly everyone has one 
or two electronic devices (smart phone, tablet, 
computer) that offer the possibility of some more 
or less sophisticated photographic image manipu-
lation process in a matter of a few minutes. As a 
result, it is not difficult to feel that image manip-
ulation has become so easy and frequent that it 
might now be the standard, and not the excep-
tion, to the rule. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
there might also be a widespread feeling about 
the unreliability of photographs (especially about 
those produced digitally in the past two decades 
or so) in terms of misrepresenting the visual prop-
erties of the scene in front of the camera at the 
time of exposure.
Our pre-theoretical intuitions about the unre-
liability of photographs and about how their 
alleged unreliability influences our perception, 
use, and interpretation of them, however, may not 
be a good guide to understanding what in fact is 
the case. In order to tackle the question of inter-
pretation in the forthcoming sections, we first 
need to explicate what constitutes manipulation 
and how photographic image manipulation relates 
to photographic deception. Let us consider photo-
graphic image manipulation first.
Although the term «photographic manipula-
tion» often carries a negative connotation, there is, 
in fact, little sense in talking about unmanipulated 
photographic images. In analogue technology the 
visual properties of the developed negative images 
and of the enlarged prints depend on the specific 
details of the image taking, developing and enlarg-
ing processes. There are necessary steps that just 
cannot be avoided in these processes. For instance, 
you cannot develop a negative or enlarge a print 
without adjusting its contrast values, and doing 
so does not result in a deceptive image (at least 
not in any standard case). Of course, «adjusting» 
is just another term for «manipulating». In other 
words, the term «manipulating» in analogue pho-
tography does not necessarily carry the negative 
connotation of resulting in some sort of deception 
in terms of forming false beliefs.
If we turn to digital photography things may 
initially look different indeed, making digital pho-
tography more prone to deceptive uses. Our expe-
rience of digital images is that they are available 
immediately on the screen of our smart phone, 
camera or computer. If we decide to modify them 
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later with some image editing software, this will 
count as «manipulation». There are, however, two 
problems with this initial, pre-theoretical impres-
sion. First, it is not the case that the image we see 
immediately after it is taken is «unmanipulated» 
in any interesting sense of the word. There are 
many settings built into smart phone and camera 
software that determine the visual properties we 
see when we first look at the photograph we have 
just taken. Second, subsequent modifications with 
an image editing software are «manipulations», 
but they may also merely have the neutral status 
of «adjusting» image properties (for instance sat-
uration and contrast level), without resulting in 
deception. In other words, we may have the same 
conclusion here as we had in the case of ana-
logue photography; the term «manipulation» in 
digital photography does not necessarily carry the 
negative connotation of resulting in some sort of 
deception in terms of deceiving the viewer about 
the visual properties of the depicted scene.
If the above considerations are correct, then 
we need to distinguish between photographic 
manipulation that merely means adjusting image 
properties by analogue or digital means on the 
one hand, and deceptive photographic manipula-
tion on the other hand. Examples for the former 
include the necessary setting of values (image 
properties), while examples for the latter (decep-
tive manipulation) include erasing persons or 
objects from a photograph or, on the contrary, 
adding persons or objects that were originally not 
in the photograph (because they were not in the 
photographed scene).
Having discussed that not all (analogue or dig-
ital) photographic image manipulations are decep-
tive, we also need to note that there are deceptive 
uses of photographic images that are not the result 
of image manipulation at all. In other words, while 
Walden only considers cases when we form false 
beliefs about the visual properties of the scene 
depicted, I think that photographic deception also 
includes deceptive uses of photographs, i.e. when 
the source of the false belief is something oth-
er than inaccurate visual information about the 
depicted scene. Consider, for instance, the 2009 
winning image of the Wildlife Photographer of 
the Year competition, taken by photographer José 
Luis Rodríguez (Figure 1). The image shows a wolf 
jumping over a fence at night. The photographer 
lost the prize later, not because the image was 
manipulated in any significant way (other than 
setting the values for colours, saturation, con-
trast, etc.), but because it turned out that the wolf 
depicted in the photograph was a trained animal. 
In other words, the photograph was staged, which 
is against the ethical rules of the wildlife photog-
raphy genre in general, and the specific rules of 
the Wildlife Photographer of the Year competition 
in particular. Given that viewers approach and 
interpret wildlife photography assuming that the 
images presented to them are not staged, a pho-
tograph using trained animals clearly deceives its 
audiences about one of its most important (photo-
graphic) properties. The deception results in mis-
interpretation4. To summarise, it is not only the 
case that not all photographic image manipula-
tions are deceptive, but there are also examples for 
photographic deception without deceptive image 
manipulation.
4 There are similar rules against staging in street photog-
raphy or photojournalism. It is also important to note, 
however, that there are numerous other photographic 
genres and practices (for instance fashion photography or 
fine art photography) where staging is allowed. There is 
no universal rule against staging photographic images.
Figure 1. José Luis Rodríguez: The Storybook Wolf, 2009 winning 
image of the Wildlife Photographer of the Year competition.
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3. HOW PHOTOGRAPHIC PROPERTIES MAY 
BECOME DECEPTIVE: READABLE AND NOT 
READABLE PHOTOGRAPHIC PROPERTIES
In order to tackle the difference between 
deceptive and non-deceptive uses of photograph-
ic images we need to consider what may or may 
not be readable from a photograph in the course 
of forming beliefs about the photographic content 
of the image. One might choose, for instance, to 
make image manipulations (such as erasures and 
additions by montage techniques) visible, that is, 
readable from the image. Similarly, there are imag-
es whose staged nature is evident just by looking 
at them5. In other words, the difference between 
deceptive and non-deceptive photographic images 
may often be located in whether or not the prop-
erties that are relevant for their interpretation are 
visible in them, and hence readable just by looking 
at them, in the context of their use. Let me explain 
this point further with some specific examples.
If a property of a photographic image that is 
relevant for its interpretation is deliberately hid-
den from the viewer, that is, the property is not 
readable from the image in the given context 
(and it is not available either in some other way 
from the context), then the interpretation will 
be flawed. This is because in this case the viewer 
relies on at least some false premises while form-
ing beliefs about the content of the photograph. 
For instance, if the viewer does not know that it is 
a composite image, then she will approach it with 
some false premises. Misinterpretation occurs not 
because of any mistake on the part of the viewer, 
but because she has been deceived. The deception 
may be the result of the manipulation of image 
properties by analogue or digital means: part of 
the image may be erased or it might be a com-
posite image of two or more different scenes. If 
the viewer cannot detect the image manipulation 
simply by looking at the image, or the nature of 
the manipulation is not available from the con-
text (for instance from the title or description of 
5 Later we will also discuss some specific examples for 
these cases.
the image), then the viewer will interpret it as an 
unmanipulated photograph6.
As we have already seen, however, it is not 
the case that only properties resulting in image 
manipulation may be hidden from the viewer. 
Such unreadable image properties may include 
the staged or unstaged nature of the image, or 
even the meaning of their photographic content 
itself (in terms of what situation it depicts). Let 
me explain this latter type with a specific exam-
ple. Figure 2 depicts a scene in a railway station 
in Bicske, Hungary, in September 2015, during 
the height of the refugee crisis. We see a young 
man and a woman with a baby, all of whom have 
fallen into the railway tracks. The man is embrac-
ing the women and is shouting desperately. The 
woman is trying to protect the baby while they 
are falling to the ground. One policeman is reach-
ing towards them and another is standing by. 
There is a third policeman looking at the scene 
from some distance with his arms folded, appar-
ently just observing the situation. Curiously, this 
image may be interpreted in at least two distinct 
ways in terms of what situation it depicts. Accord-
ing to one interpretation this family was about to 
be separated by the police, and the man was try-
ing to hold on to and protect his wife and their 
6 See section 5 for the explication of the default photo-
graphic interpretation.
Figure 2. László Balogh: Bicske, Hungary, September 3, 2015. © 
Reuters.
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baby. According to another interpretation the man 
was not related to the woman and the baby. He in 
fact attacked them, running amok in a desperate 
attempt to convince the authorities to let him con-
tinue on his way to Austria. According to this lat-
ter interpretation the police were trying to protect 
the woman and baby from him. The visual photo-
graphic content is compatible with both interpre-
tations, while only one of these might be correct 
in terms of describing the real situation, context 
and content of the image. A deceptive use of this 
image would be to present or publish it with the 
wrong interpretation, while knowing it to be false. 
This would constitute a deceptive use of a photo-
graphic image without altering any of its relevant 
visual properties. As with the wolf example, the 
falsity of the interpretation would not be readable 
from the image; the viewer may well be misled 
because she has been provided with an incorrect 
context and interpretation.
There are also, however, images whose visual 
properties do allow us to understand in what way 
they misrepresent the visual properties of the scene 
that had been in front of the camera at the time 
of exposure. Many composite photographs, for 
instance, straightforwardly present themselves as 
montages; their composite nature is readable just by 
observing their visual properties. Atencia-Linares 
(2012) and Woodwart (2016), for instance, discuss 
Io Gatto (1932) by Wanda Wulz (Figure 3). Aten-
cia-Linares argues that this photograph represents a 
fictional entity by purely photographic means (mul-
tiple-exposure technique). In section 5 I will briefly 
discuss this position in terms of the possible inter-
pretations of the image, but for our current pur-
poses it is enough to observe that this photograph 
certainly does not deceive us about its composite 
nature: on the contrary, it is an important aspect of 
its interpretation to realise (to form a belief) that 
the image is a multiple exposure montage.
There are also other types of photographs that 
do not deceive us, even though they do in fact 
misrepresent the visual properties of the scene in 
front of the camera at the time of exposure. As I 
argue elsewhere (Bátori 2015), black and white 
photographs, for instance, (or even those with 
higher or lower levels of colour fidelity) do not 
represent colours faithfully: they represent col-
ours, such as yellow or red, with shades of grey. 
The reason we are not deceived by black and white 
photographs about the colours of the scene depict-
ed is that we are aware of the practice of black and 
white photography, and we use this knowledge 
when interpreting black and white photographic 
images. The fact that they do not represent col-
ours faithfully is apparent when we look at them: 
that is, it is readable from black and white photo-
graphs how they misrepresent what they depict. 
We do not form false beliefs about the colours of 
the objects depicted in the photograph because we 
do not form any beliefs about their colours (oth-
er than what is readable from a black and white 
image; for instance that one is darker or lighter 
than the other).
The readability of which properties of the 
depicted scene photographs do, or do not repre-
Figure 3. Wanda Wulz: Io Gatto, 1932.
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sent faithfully is an important aspect of interpret-
ing all photographic images. This is precisely what 
distinguishes deceptive and non-deceptive photo-
graphic images in terms of whether they mislead 
us about some aspect of the scene they depict. In 
some cases, however, this is more than merely an 
epistemic concern about all kinds of photographs. 
An example is fine art photographs, where reada-
bility also has the function of informing our inter-
pretation of aesthetically relevant properties.
Take, for instance, the aforementioned exam-
ple of black and white photography. While being 
black and white (or, more precisely, monochrome) 
was a standard property of photographic images 
during most of the history of the medium, today 
monochrome is a contra-standard artistic choice. 
I use «standard» and «contra-standard» as specific 
terms here as explicated by Walton (1970). Stand-
ard properties are the ones that establish a work in 
a given category (medium, genre etc.); recognis-
ing standard properties means that we recognise 
a work as belonging to a specific category. Flat-
ness and motionlessness, for instance, are stand-
ard properties of photographic images. Contra-
standard properties, however, either disqualify a 
work from a category (being drawn disqualifies an 
image from the category of photography) or they 
are interpreted as aesthetically relevant artistic 
choices7. Being monochrome today does not dis-
qualify images from the category of photography, 
but because of its now contra-standard nature, it 
is to be interpreted. For instance, if we look at a 
monochrome photograph that was taken in the 
first part of the 20th century, we will assume that 
the photographer used a black and white negative 
simply because that is what was available to her. 
In other words, her use of monochrome was the 
technological default of her time, not an artistic 
choice that would need to be interpreted and eval-
uated aesthetically. Today, however, we know that 
colour technology is not only readily available, but 
it is the standard now. Monochrome has become 
contra-standard, and as such, to be interpreted as 
7 For a detailed discussion of standard, variable and con-
tra-standard aesthetic properties see Walton (1970).
an artistic choice8. From the point of view of the 
readability of what visual properties are represent-
ed realistically by a photograph, this is significant 
because in the case of monochrome photographic 
images the artistic choice of not representing col-
ours realistically is readable, and hence it becomes 
an important aspect in the interpretation and eval-
uation of the photograph.
Finally, let us consider another example of the 
connection between readability and the interpre-
tation of the aesthetically relevant properties of 
photographic images. Staged fine art photography 
is a broad category that includes numerous differ-
ent types of artistic communication with staged 
photographs, from still life to directorial photog-
raphy. Gregory Crewdson, for instance, creates 
staged images that depict scenes that (consider-
ing their content) often resemble spontaneous 
snapshots of captured moments9. This, however, 
does not result in deception and misinterpreta-
tion, for viewers can clearly recognise (and form 
true beliefs about) the staged nature of these 
images just by looking at them (see Figure 4, for 
instance). Staging may be recognised by noticing 
visual clues, such as the often artificially lethargic 
bodily postures of the persons in the photographs 
8 I first discussed how monochrome has become contra-
standard in Bátori (2016).
9 For a discussion on Crewdson photography see also 
Bátori (2016).
Figure 4. Gregory Crewdson: Untitled, 2003-2005. © Gregory 
Crewdson. Courtesy Gagosian.
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and the unnatural, filmic lighting. The readability 
of staging is an important aspect of the interpre-
tation and aesthetic evaluation of these images, 
because staging is one of the important aesthetic 
properties of the works. It is precisely the tension 
between the created and recognisably false spon-
taneity and the elaborated staging that adds a layer 
of artistic meaning to the images, which would 
be lost or misunderstood without the readability 
of the staged nature of the images. These photo-
graphs do not mislead us about their properties: 
on the contrary, their transparency about them is 
an important condition of their interpretation and 
evaluation, both as photographic images and as 
artworks.
4. PHOTOGRAPHIC ILLOCUTIONARY ACTS 
AND DECEPTION
In the previous section I discussed the role 
of readability in photographic communication in 
general and in fine art photography in particular. 
Let us now turn to a closer examination of the 
processes of interpretation, to see the mechanisms 
in which readability and forming true beliefs play 
such a crucial role. In order to do so we will rely 
on the theory of pictorial illocutionary acts that 
was first suggested by Kjørup (1974, 1978) and 
Novitz (1975, 1977), extending the original speech 
act theory by Austin (1962) and Searle (1969). Let 
us first examine pictorial illocutionary acts in gen-
eral. Then we will turn to photographic illocution-
ary acts as a specific subcategory of pictorial illo-
cutionary acts10.
4.1. Pictorial illocutionary acts
According to Kjørup (1974, 1978) and Novitz 
(1975, 1977) we perform actions not only with 
words and sentences as Austin (1962) and Searle 
(1969) suggested, but also with pictures. In other 
words, producing and presenting a picture to oth-
10 For pictorial and photographic illocutionary acts see 
also Bátori (2015).
ers constitutes a pictorial locutionary act that is 
functionally analogous to verbal locutionary acts. 
Of course, linguistic and pictorial locutionary acts 
are considerably different from the point of view 
of the nature of their literal meanings and the 
structure of their complex meanings. Pictures do 
not have components that are analogous to words 
and syntax, therefore the literal meaning of picto-
rial locutionary acts must be explicated in a differ-
ent way. While in the case of natural languages we 
need to learn the conventional (symbolic) seman-
tic meaning of words and the syntactic structure 
of the specific language, when looking at pictures 
we rely on our standard visual recognition capaci-
ties (object recognition, face recognition, etc.) that 
we use in ordinary seeing. (By «ordinary seeing» 
I merely mean looking at objects and scenes.) 
As Currie (1995) argues, natural (literal) picto-
rial meaning is based on our visual recognition 
capacities. It is «natural» (as opposed to «sym-
bolic») because we do not have to learn the literal 
semantic meaning of a (photographic or non-pho-
tographic) picture of a giraffe, for instance; we rec-
ognize giraffes, drawings of giraffes, photographs 
of giraffes, etc. after seeing just a few giraffes or 
images of giraffes. The recognition of giraffe pic-
tures is based on our ability to recognize the visu-
al properties of giraffes, not on our ability to learn 
the conventional (symbolic) meaning of the words 
of natural languages11.
Once a pictorial locutionary act is produced 
and (based on our visual recognition capacities) 
we understand its literal pictorial meaning, we 
also interpret the image to understand what picto-
rial illocutionary act was performed with the pic-
ture in the given context. This includes (with the 
exception of deception) the understanding that 
the picture was intended to be interpreted that 
way.  For instance, we interpret a picture of a run-
ning deer on a traffic sign next to the road as a 
locutionary act for the illocutionary act of warn-
ing us about the possibility that deer might cross 
the road.
11 See also section 2.
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4.2. Photographic illocutionary acts
Photographic illocutionary acts constitute a 
specific case of pictorial illocutionary acts (Bátori 
[2015]). The photographic image itself (in any 
visible printed or digital form) is a photographic 
locutionary act. As in the case of other pictorial 
illocutionary acts, we rely on our visual recogni-
tion capacities to understand the literal meaning 
of photographic images (see the discussion above). 
The literal meaning of the photographic locution-
ary act gets interpreted in the specific context 
to understand what photographic illocutionary 
act was performed by producing and presenting 
the photographic image (as a locutionary act). 
Although this is a general characteristic of all pic-
torial illocutionary acts, the interpretation of pho-
tographic locutionary acts is considerably more 
specific, and it diverges from the interpretation of 
non-photographic images. I suggest that photo-
graphic locutionary acts are always interpreted as 
the result of (analogue or digital) photographic pro-
cesses, even if the viewer only has a very superfi-
cial knowledge about the technical details of those 
processes. In other words, photographic images 
produced and presented as photographic locution-
ary acts always get interpreted qua photographs, 
as opposed to drawings, paintings or any other 
non-photographic images. Viewers are aware of 
(have beliefs about) the specific ontological and 
epistemic status of photographic images, and this 
knowledge plays a significant role in the interpre-
tation process of photographic illocutionary acts. 
Let us see now what this specific ontological and 
epistemic status consists in.
The indexical nature of photographic images 
has been explicated in several ways. Kendall Wal-
ton’s (1984, 1986, 1997), for instance, argues that 
because of the causal mechanical nature of the 
photographic processes, the visual properties of 
photographic images counterfactually depend on 
the visual properties of the scene depicted. Should 
the visual properties of the scene be different, the 
visual properties of the image would also be dif-
ferent. Viewers do not have to (and in fact they 
usually do not) have much knowledge about the 
technical details of the photographic processes 
in order to grasp the significance of the casual 
physical connection between the visual proper-
ties of the scene and the visual properties of the 
photographic image. Furthermore, they also know 
that there is no such mechanical causal connec-
tion between the visual properties of scenes and 
the visual properties of non-photographic images, 
such as paintings or drawings. Viewers know that 
intentionally preserving counterfactual depend-
ence is possible, that is, a painter may decide to 
paint the visual properties of a scene realistically, 
but it is an artistic choice, not the result of a caus-
al chain of mechanical processes.
The mind-independent, natural counter-
factual dependence of the visual properties of 
a photographic image on the visual properties 
of the scene depicted, however, is not an artis-
tic choice. In order to understand the ontologi-
cal and epistemic status of photographic images, 
it is sufficient merely to have a vague, pre-theo-
retical knowledge about how photographic pro-
cesses involve the mechanical recording of light 
values, and how those processes differ from the 
decisions of artists of hand-produced, non-pho-
tographic images. In other words, when people 
interpret photographic images they have a suffi-
cient understanding of (beliefs about) what kind 
of images photographs are, as opposed to non-
photographic images (ontological status) and 
also what type of knowledge they may expect to 
gain about the scene depicted by photographs 
(epistemic status). Since the specific epistemic 
status of photographic images is a consequence 
of their ontological status, it is also understood 
that information about the visual properties of 
the depicted scene has a different epistemic sta-
tus in the case of photographic compared with 
non-photographic images. Viewers know that if 
the photographic image is not manipulated in 
ways that conceal how counterfactual depend-
ence was altered, then they may expect to learn 
mind-independent information about the visual 
properties of the scene depicted.
To summarise, I suggest that photographic 
illocutionary acts differ from other, non-photo-
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graphic, pictorial illocutionary acts because in the 
case of photographic illocutionary acts the pho-
tographic nature of the locutionary act is always 
part of the interpretation process. Viewers know 
that the visual properties of photographs coun-
terfactually depend on the visual properties of the 
depicted scene, and their interpretation of photo-
graphs (photographic locutionary acts) is based 
on this knowledge. It is also important to note 
that our knowledge about the ontological and 
epistemic status of photographic images is a nec-
essary component of this process. If we mistake a 
painting for a photograph, for instance, then we 
misinterpret it. If we mistake a photograph for a 
painting, then we misinterpret it as well. In the 
next section we will examine how these observa-
tions are compatible with the fact that viewers 
also know about the possible ways they may be 
deceived with photographs.
5. DEFAULT PHOTOGRAPHIC 
INTERPRETATION
Let us now return to photographic manipula-
tion and deception in the light of our observations 
about readability and photographic illocution-
ary acts. I think that now we are in a better posi-
tion to consider if and how our knowledge about 
the possibility of photographic manipulation and 
deception may influence our interpretation of 
photographic images. I will argue that it has no 
more influence than does our (analogous) knowl-
edge about the possibility of being lied to, on our 
interpretation of verbal utterances.
In verbal communication our default interpre-
tation of verbal locutionary acts is based on our 
attitude that we consider them sincere and truth-
ful in the sense that they are not uttered with the 
intention to deceive us. We maintain this attitude 
at least until we have some reason to suspect that 
we might be deceived. We know that the person 
might be mistaken (and hence the utterance might 
be false), and we also know that sometimes peo-
ple deliberately tell lies in order to deceive oth-
ers. Nevertheless, this is not what we expect to 
be the case, and being suspicious about possible 
deceptions is not our default attitude towards ver-
bal locutionary acts. I suggest that we approach 
photographic locutionary acts in a similar man-
ner. We know that many photographic images are 
manipulated; in fact I argued earlier that all pho-
tographic images are manipulated in the sense of 
adjusting some of the settings for the visual prop-
erties of the image. However, as we have seen, 
manipulation may simply mean adjusting visual 
properties of the image without deceiving the 
viewer about the properties of the depicted scene. 
We know, however, both that some manipulations 
may result in misrepresenting the visual properties 
of the scene, and also that there are deceptive uses 
of photographic images even if their visual prop-
erties are not manipulated to misrepresent the 
depicted scene. Nevertheless, with photographic 
images, as with verbal communication, our default 
interpretation is not based on a suspicion that we 
might be deceived.
I would like to conclude that the default inter-
pretation of photographic images primarily relies 
on our more, or less, precise knowledge about the 
difference between the ontological and epistemic 
status of photographic images on the one hand, 
and drawings, paintings, and other non-photo-
graphic images on the other. The relevant differ-
ence is that photographic images are indexical: 
the visual properties of the image counterfactually 
depend on the visual properties of the depicted 
scene. In the case of photographs counterfactual 
dependence is natural, that is, the result of a caus-
al physical connection between the scene and the 
image. In the case of non-photographic images, 
however, intentionally preserving counterfactual 
dependence is always an artistic choice12.
When interpreting verbal locutionary acts, we 
assume that they are to be interpreted as sincere 
and truthful until we have some reason to sus-
pect that the contrary is the case. Analogously to 
verbal communication, when looking at photo-
graphs we also maintain our default interpretation 
12 On the default photographic interpretation see also 
Bátori (2016).
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until we have reason to abandon it. For instance, 
if we can visually detect a type of image editing 
that would alter its photographic nature, then our 
default interpretation is replaced by another inter-
pretation in which indexicality and counterfac-
tual dependence are not assumed. In the case of 
a compound image, such as the aforementioned 
collage Io Gatto by Wanda Wulz, we can know 
(by looking at it) that the visual properties of the 
image do not depend counterfactually on the vis-
ual properties of a single original scene. Atencia-
Linares (2012) argues that since only traditional 
photographic processes were involved in its crea-
tion, Io Gatto is a photograph of a fictional enti-
ty (cat-woman). I think this position is mistaken 
precisely because we do not approach Io Gatto 
with our default photographic interpretation. Its 
composite nature is readable, we know that there 
was no such scene (entity) to be photographed, 
and we replace our default photographic inter-
pretation with another one that is suitable for col-
lages. In other words, we do not interpret collages 
(even collages composed solely of photographic 
images) as photographs, but as collages (of photo-
graphic images). We would only approach Io Gatto 
with our default photographic interpretation if we 
were in fact deceived into believing that the image 
is a photograph of cat-woman. That belief, howev-
er, would also involve (false) belief in the existence 
of cat-woman.
My suggestion for the default photographic 
interpretation discussed in this section is consist-
ent with the observation that there are also con-
texts in which we are likely to suspend our default 
photographic interpretation. In these cases it is 
not the readability of image modification that 
prevents us from being deceived (as in the case 
of readable montages), but our contextual knowl-
edge, including the information that the image 
belongs to a specific genre, and our knowledge 
about the genre itself. For instance, while photo-
realist paintings look like photographic images, 
we do not approach them with the default pho-
tographic interpretation. We interpret them as 
paintings, and it is one of their aesthetically rel-
evant (contra-standard) properties that they 
look like photographs. On the other hand, if we 
encounter a photograph that looks like a paint-
ing, once we learn that it is a photograph, we will 
approach it with the default photographic inter-
pretation. One of its aesthetically relevant (con-
tra-standard) properties will be that it looks like 
a painting. Looking like a photograph is a stand-
ard feature of photographic images. Looking like 
a painting is a contra-standard feature to be inter-
preted. Furthermore, we also suspend the default 
photographic interpretation for the fictional use 
of photographs: we understand them as photo-
graphs of actors playing roles, not as photographs 
of fictional characters. In the light of our knowl-
edge about the extensive modification of the visual 
properties of photographs of fashion models, we 
are also cautious about considering fashion pho-
tographs to be faithful representations of the vis-
ual properties of models. While we know about 
the professional ethical rules of photojournalism, 
we also know that no such rules have been estab-
lished in fashion photography.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper I first considered the connec-
tion between photographic image manipula-
tion and photographic deception. I argued that 
image manipulations are only deceptive if they 
cause us to form false beliefs about the depicted 
scene when looking at the manipulated image. 
In order to clarify the status and role of image 
manipulation I suggested that we need to distin-
guish between photographic manipulations that 
deceive the viewers about the visual properties of 
the depicted scene, and manipulations that merely 
adjust some of the visual properties of the image 
without being deceptive. I suggested that we are 
only deceived into forming false beliefs about the 
depicted scene if the nature of the image manipu-
lation is not readable from the image, or if we do 
not know all the relevant information about the 
image from the context. In order to show that 
photographic deception is not confined to image 
manipulation I also presented examples of the 
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deceptive uses of photographs whose visual prop-
erties were not manipulated in any way that would 
cause the viewer to form false beliefs about the 
depicted scene.
In the second part of the paper I offered 
a theory of photographic illocutionary acts to 
account for the interpretive processes involved 
in understanding and evaluating photographs. A 
photographic illocutionary act is a specific type of 
pictorial illocutionary act that takes into account 
the ontological and epistemic status of photo-
graphs, as opposed to non-photographic images. I 
argued that even superficial knowledge about the 
nature of the mechanical photographic processes 
is sufficient to form the pre-theoretical under-
standing of the difference between the «objectiv-
ity» of the photographic images and the «sub-
jectivity» of hand-produced non-photographic 
images. The «objectivity» of photographs has been 
explicated in terms of the natural counterfactual 
dependence of the visual properties of the pho-
tographs on the visual properties of the depicted 
scene. The «subjectivity» of non-photographic 
images means that while counterfactual depend-
ence of the visual properties of non-photograph-
ic images on the visual properties of the depict-
ed scene is also possible, it is always an artistic 
choice, that is, a mind-dependent, intentional 
counterfactual dependence.
Finally I suggested that our default interpreta-
tion of photographic images relies on our knowl-
edge of the ontological and epistemic status of 
photographs, and not on the possibility of pho-
tographic deception. I argued that photographic 
illocutionary acts are similar to speech acts with 
respect to our default assumption of sincere, non-
deceptive communication until we have reason 
to think otherwise. Although the ease of digital 
image manipulation has made us acutely aware 
of the possibility of deception, I think that the 
default interpretation of photographic images is 
still based on their specific ontological and epis-
temic status. We interpret and appreciate photo-
graphs as photographic images, not as hand-pro-
duced images or montages, and our default pho-
tographic interpretation is independent of the spe-
cific analogue or digital technology by which the 
images are produced.
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